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Preface 
 
 
New Zealand is widely regarded as having innovative fisheries management systems.  
However commercial marine fishing activities can create many types of environmental 
externalities.  Fisheries legislation requires that the externalities be internalised and fisheries 
management agencies must choose from a wide range of instruments those which are best 
suited to the tasks determined in the relevant legislation.  Selection of best instruments can be 
aided by following a hierarchical decision process, which first screens the universe of devices 
to produce a feasible set.  Instruments in the feasible set can be rated against several 
performance criteria and the ratings combined to give weighted scores for each feasible 
instrument. 
 
The research reported in this publication explains how Environmental Impact Assessment 
techniques can assist in identifying the significant externalities which occur in commercial 
fishing.  It subsequently reviews the literature and examines case studies to identify the range 
of externalities associated with New Zealand commercial marine fisheries.  Finally it trawls 
the literature to establish the broad range of possible instruments for use  in internalising 
fisheries externalities.  The instruments and their current New Zealand and world uses are 
grouped in five categories. 
 
AERU Research Report No 243 outlines the criteria used  to rank the instruments listed in 
this report, and the Decision Support System developed to aid fisheries managers select 
internalisation instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ross Cullen 
DIRECTOR 
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Summary 
 
 
Commercial fisheries in New Zealand having significant environmental externalities are 
identified and a framework for comparative Environmental Impact Assessment is proposed.  
From this analysis and from a survey of international literature covering the spectrum of 
resource sectors a range of 21 instruments within five broad categories is proposed as having 
potential for application within commercial fisheries management.  These categories are: 
Regulatory approaches (9 instruments), Financial incentives (5 instruments), Voluntary 
approaches (4 instruments), Legal Remedies (1 instrument), and Education and Information 
Supply (2 instruments).  Most of the regulatory and financial instruments have had some 
application in New Zealand, although 'environmental performance bonds' (used extensively 
in mining) might have potential for application to some fisheries.  Voluntary approaches are 
being developed and there is potential for much further application in New Zealand, subject 
to auditing-type requirements.  Legal remedies (tort law) and 'Informal regulation', including 
corporate environmental reporting, also offer potential as internalisation instruments.  The 
major challenge facing fisheries managers is how to determine which instrument or 
combination of instruments is most likely to be effective in internalising the externality(s). 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Brief background 
 
Sustainable fisheries management is an important policy issue worldwide from ecological, 
social and economic perspectives.   A particular area of current concern in New Zealand is 
the negative environmental externalities (unintended side effects – see section 4.1 for a 
detailed definition) associated with commercial fishing practices.  As part of giving effect to 
key principles of the Fisheries Act 19961 the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) is in the process 
of developing its Fisheries 2010 strategy, complementary to the Government’s Environment 
2010 strategy (Ministry for the Environment 1995).  One of the 12 founding principles, upon 
which the Fisheries 2010 strategy will be based, states: 
 
“Internalisation of External Environmental Costs: Fisheries management policy should 
ensure the unpriced environmental effects (or external costs) associated with fishing 
are 'internalised', that is, they are assessed and consistently charged, where 
appropriate, to users and consumers who benefit from them.”  
(Ministry of Fisheries 1996). 
 
The term ‘environment’ is not defined in the Fisheries Act 1996 but is assumed, as per the 
stated rationale in the MFish brief upon which this work is based, to be aquatic environment 
and the biophysical features thereof.  
 
The stated overall objective of the MFish project, SEC 1999/05, is: 
 
“to determine methods or processes to internalise the environmental externalities of 
commercial fishing that will allow fisheries managers to address the obligations in the 
Fisheries Act 1996 to avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects on the aquatic 
environment”. 
 
The purpose of this report is to fulfil the requirements of objective 1 of the contract, i.e., “to 
review the economic, environmental, and resource management literature, including case  
                                                          
1 The Fisheries Act 1996 includes the following key sections within PART II: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES: 
SECT. 8. PURPOSE-- 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. 
(2) In this Act-- 
"Ensuring sustainability" means-- 
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment: 
"Utilisation" means conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their 
social, economic, and cultural wellbeing. 
SECT. 9. ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES-- 
All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this Act, in relation to the utilisation of fisheries 
resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into account the following environmental principles: 
(a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their long-term viability: 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained: 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected. 
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studies relating to internalising environmental externalities, having regard to a full range of 
regulatory, economic, social, institutional, and behavioural policy instruments”. 
 
1.2 The Policy Question/Framework 
 
Decision makers in fisheries management, when faced with environmental problems, have a 
logical sequence of decisions which they must work through before deciding on the policy 
instruments which are most likely to resolve the environmental problems.  This sequence is 
as follows: 
 
(i)  The environmental impacts/externalities must be defined. 
(ii)  The type of fishery within which the impact/externalities occur must be defined. 
(iii)  The significance of the environmental impacts/externalities must be evaluated. 
(iv)  The range of policy instrument(s) that will best internalise the externalities must be 
determined. 
(v)  The effectiveness of these instruments, in meeting the environmental aims of fisheries 
and other related legislation, needs determining. 
(vi) Instruments are selected that best meet a range of evaluation criteria. 
 
Like section 5(2)(b) of the Resource Management Act (1991) (RMA), the Fisheries Act 
(1996) includes a provision for ‘avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of 
fishing on the aquatic environment’ (section 8(2)(b)).  However, unlike the RMA, the 
Fisheries Act does not include any specific provisions for undertaking EIAs against which 
internalisation instruments could then be recommended (see Williams 1997: 508).  
Consequently, before identifying internalisation instruments we think it is important to 
develop an EIA framework appropriate for fisheries management and consistent with the 
Government’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (last revised 1987, 
Williams 1997).  This requirement is also observed in Auditor-General (1999: 54) who 
concluded: 
 
“… currently, the Ministry is not able to make informed recommendations to the minister 
on issues such as the effects of fishing on the environment, and inter-relationships of fish 
species.” 
 
1.3 Study Approach 
 
In the tender we stated “our methodological approach to addressing the project requirements 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. review the literature and examine case studies (and where necessary by other means) 
to identify the externalities associated with New Zealand commercial fisheries and the 
internalisation instruments potentially applicable to fisheries management; 
2. determine criteria, using an iterative process incorporating identification, checking and 
revising, to evaluate the application of these instruments to internalise environmental 
externalities in the range of New Zealand commercial fisheries contexts; and 
3. develop a decision support system and guidelines, in part by using an iterative process, 
for the use of these criteria to assist select appropriate internalisation instruments by 
the Ministry.” 
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For objective 1 we have reviewed the literature and examined case studies to: 
 
1. identify the externalities associated with New Zealand fisheries; and  
2. the internalisation instruments potentially applicable to fisheries management. 
 
In undertaking this work we have used an iterative approach which involved: 
 
1. undertaking a preliminary literature review, providing this review to MFish for 
comment, gaining feedback from the Ministry and revising the content; 
2. clarifying the decision-making process (see section 2.2) to further include a 
framework for assessing the significance of environmental externalities (i.e., an EIA 
framework).  This task is important for policy analysts as it enables them to identify 
and concentrate on high priority environmental issues. 
 
Upon beginning this review we observed that the categories of: statutory controls and 
incentives; institutional design and participation processes; and education are broadly 
encompassing of the range of instruments that could be used to internalise externalities.  To 
explore each of these categories it was necessary to examine the full range of regulatory, 
economic, social, institutional, and behavioural policy instruments.   
 
1.4 Report Format 
 
The report has three main sections, apart from the introduction and conclusions: 
 
1. In section 2 we develop an Environmental Impact Assessment framework appropriate 
for fisheries management.   
2. We then identify the range and relative significance of biophysical environmental 
externalities associated with commercial fishing in New Zealand (section 3).  This part 
of the review also helps identify the range of instruments already in use in New 
Zealand and assists with identifying case studies against which new instruments and 
criteria for selection can subsequently be tested (part 2 of the SEC 1999/05 research); 
3. Section 4 examines the range of instruments that can be used to internalise 
environmental externalities.  The instruments are outlined, the resources/issues they 
have been applied to are summarised, and their application, or potential if not already 
applied, to fisheries management is evaluated.  This section concludes with an 
identification and evaluation of instruments we consider have potential within the 
New Zealand context. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM FISHING 
 
 
 
2.1. Background to EIA and Relevance to Fisheries 
 
Fishery managers are often unable to address all environmental issues immediately. 
Consequently, issue prioritisation becomes necessary. The environmental impact assessment 
literature provides frameworks within which this prioritisation may take place. One of the 
most widely utilised frameworks is the Leopold Matrix, which was originally developed for 
the United States Geological Survey (Leopold et al, 1971). 
 
The Leopold Matrix lists all activity (project) actions along one axis and all potential impact 
parameters along the other. For example, scallop dredging (the activity) would include 
actions such as: shipping, dredging, wildlife stocking & management, ocean dumping, 
exhaust emissions, spills & leaks, and operational failure. The impact of each of these actions 
on each impact parameter is assessed and scored on two different criteria, impact magnitude 
(on a scale of –10 to +10, with negative signs indicating undesirable impacts) and impact 
importance (on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning not important). The completed matrix 
provides a visual indicator of both the range and severity of impacts. 
 
Key criticisms that have been addressed to the matrix approach include (Glasson, Therivel 
and Chadwick, 1999; Morgan, 1998): 
 
 Non-inclusion of spatial aspects of impacts, 
 Non-inclusion of temporal aspects of impacts,  
 Inability to include indirect impacts, 
 Inability to model synergistic impacts. 
 
Some of these criticisms can be addressed through the development of guidelines for use of 
the matrix.  Matrix approaches to impact identification and evaluation are simple tools that 
help to organise information and provide it with an initial structure. Network and system 
models provide richer descriptions of effects and interactions, but are much more complex 
than matrices. The Leopold matrix provides an indication of overall significance of an 
activity or proposal – but the limitations of the approach must be recognised, particularly in 
an environment as complex as marine fisheries. 
 
One avenue for assessing relative impacts of different activities is to derive parameter impact 
scores for each cell in the Leopold Matrix by multiplying parameter impact magnitude and 
parameter importance scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact 
magnitude 
Parameter 
importance 
Parameter Impact 
score 
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All parameter impact scores for the activity are then added to derive an overall activity 
impact score. This approach has been criticised by Clark et al. (1979) because the importance 
of the different impact categories is implicitly given equal weighting. If  this approach were 
adopted, the highest relative weights would occur by default in impact categories with the 
largest number of impact parameters. This criticism has been addressed by weighted matrix 
approaches, such as the Battelle Environmental Evaluation System (Dee et al. 1973) and the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Water Resource Assessment Methodology (WRAM) 
(Solomon et al. 1977). Within their specific contexts, these approaches weight factors for 
importance within and between categories. For example, the Battelle EES breaks 
environmental impacts into 4 categories (ecology, environmental pollution, aesthetics, and 
human interest) before breaking each of those categories into sub-categories and specific 
parameters to which importance scores are pre-ascribed. The weights for the Battelle matrix 
were derived by asking a group of experts to allocate 1000 points across the 74 impact 
parameters included in the matrix. Similarly, the WRAM uses the sub-categories:  
 
environmental quality, regional development, national economic development, and social 
wellbeing. 
 
2.2. An EIA/AEE Assessment Framework  
 
These impact identification and evaluation systems form the basis of the approach utilised 
within this study to evaluate the relative merits of alternative environmental externality 
management policies. Initially, however, the use of matrix approaches to issue prioritisation 
is described. Table 1 reproduces a reduced form of the original Leopold Matrix that has been 
revised to incorporate better the elements of the marine fishery environment. In the interests 
of relevance and parsimony, all activities and impacts that are not relevant to commercial 
marine fishing have been removed. Some elements have been slightly redefined or added. For 
example, in the original matrix there is no parameter that would address impacts on non-
endangered dolphins. The parameter “mammals” has been added to allow their incorporation. 
 
For any particular activity many cells in the Leopold Matrix will be empty.  For example, the 
activity “Paua fishing” involves only a limited number of actions.  It does not involve 
dredging or ocean dumping and exhaust emissions are so small that they can be ignored.  
Similarly, many impacts will be non-existent. Paua fishing, for example, has no effect on 
erosion or deposition.  One cell is completed in table 1 to indicate how information is 
reported.  For the activity under consideration (say Scallop fishing) the magnitude of the 
impact of the act of dredging on erosion is –6 (quite large and negative), while its importance 
is 5 (moderate).  The parameter impact score for this fictitious example would therefore be –
30. 
 
The modified Leopold matrix does not incorporate the relative importance of the different 
impact classes.  To address this issue, weighted matrices are often used. These incorporate 
value judgements about the importance of different impact classes, often derived by voting or 
Delphi approaches.  A weighted matrix that uses the four classes represented in the Leopold 
matrix is presented in Table 2.  Weights have been arbitrarily set in order to illustrate the 
operation of this simple tool.  In this case, biological factors have been judged to be most 
important (importance score of 40/100), while cultural factors have been judged to be least 
important (10/100). Impacts range from –10 (extreme negative impact) to +10 (extreme 
positive impact). The impacts may be derived from inspection of the Leopold matrices for 
each fishery, or by utilisation of aggregate parameter impact scores for each impact category 
within the Leopold matrix.  The aggregate parameter impact scores will, of course, need to be 
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scaled to derive impacts within the –10,+10 range.  Fishery C has the greatest negative 
aggregate impact under the illustrative weighting scheme in Table 2.  
 
Clearly, the outcome of such an approach is highly dependent on a number of judgements.  
Changing the weights in the weighted matrix can have a dramatic effect on the ordering of 
total impacts.  No less importantly, the importance and impact scores in the Leopold matrix 
are judgements that can have a significant impact on final outcomes.  While these matrix 
approaches have a number of deficiencies, their utility should not be under-estimated.  They 
provide a simple, yet coherent, method for screening the aggregate set of fishery management 
“problems” in order to prioritise those most in need of management attention.  It should be 
noted, however, that such screening approaches do not identify the ability of managers to 
resolve the problems identified as having the greatest impacts. 
 7
 
 
Table 1 
Fishing Impact Matrix 
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Physical and chemical characteristics  
Ocean (water quality)         
Atmospheric quality         
Erosion  -6/5       
Deposition         
Biological conditions  
Non-endangered aquatic plants         
Endangered plant species         
Non-endangered birds         
Endangered birds         
Non-endangered mammals         
Endangered mammals         
Non-endangered fish & shellfish (includes 
bycatch) 
        
Endangered fish & shellfish (includes bycatch)         
Non-endangered benthic organisms         
Endangered benthic organisms         
Ecological relationships  
Food chains         
Cultural factors  
Wilderness & open spaces         
Recreational fishing         
Recreational boating         
Recreational swimming         
Parks & reserves         
Unique species or ecosystems         
Cultural patterns, lifestyle (includes tangata 
whenua) 
        
Health & safety         
Employment         
Transportation network (movement access)         
Utility networks         
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Table 2 
Weighted Impact Matrix (hypothetical only) 
 
Fishery A Fishery B Fishery C Environmental 
component 
Weight 
Impact Score Impact Score Impact Score 
Physical & chemical 
characteristics 
20 -9 -180 -3 -60 -5 -100
Biological 
conditions 
40 -2 -80 -5 -200 -4 -160
Ecological 
relationships 
30 -5 -150 -4 -120 -6 -180
Cultural factors 10 3 30 3 30 4 40
Total 100  -380  -350  -400
Score = Impact x Weight 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIAL FISHING 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
 
There has been a great deal of research around the world into the externalities associated with 
commercial fishing.  The negative biophysical externalities caused by commercial fishing 
activities can generally be ascribed to one or a combination of the following: 
 
 Habitat damage, e.g., as a result of dredging or bottom trawling; 
 Disruption to the food chain through excessive harvest of a predator or prey species, 
e.g., the rig-paddle crab relationship; 
 Nonfish bycatch, e.g., mainly seals, dolphins and birds in NZ waters; 
 Non target fish species bycatch impacting on these fisheries and on other types of 
fishers, e.g., recreational; 
 Discarding, i.e., catching and dumping of undersized or non-commercial fish stock; 
and 
 Marine pollution through deliberate or accidental actions including, for example, gear 
losses and wastes from fish processing. 
 
This section of the report will describe the situation with respect to the NZ fisheries from this 
perspective. It is primarily based on recent  (post 1990) published and unpublished research.   
Findings from other countries will be used where there is insufficient NZ information to 
comment on the likelihood of similar externalities in New Zealand. We are cognisant that 
there may be potentially significant unpublished information in the Ministry of Fisheries 
records in Wellington and in the regional offices relating to instances of observed 
environmental impacts associated with fishing activities but we have not had an opportunity 
to access this data. 
 
One of the problems we faced in reviewing the literature on environmental externalities was 
how to determine the relative significance of externalities i.e., how to express the extent of 
the externality problem in terms of indices such as species survival, sustainability, etc.  While 
many authors have identified the types of externalities associated with particular fisheries, 
few have been able to report on their significance.  Significance is important for several 
reasons: 
 
 To meet the requirements of sections 8 (Sustainability) and 9 (Environmental 
principles) of the Fisheries Act 1996 (see footnote 1); 
 To determine the relative ecological impacts of the different externalities so that 
priorities for remedial action can be determined; 
 So that only those impacts that are deemed significant problems are managed. 
 
In undertaking this review we have looked for and tabulated the following attributes of  
biophysical environmental externalities: 
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 Types of externalities 
 Fisheries the externalities occur in 
 Why the externality occurs 
 Significance of the externality (if stated) 
 
Comments are made on each of these attributes following the tabulation below. 
 
The main types of externalities and their level of significance in key NZ fisheries are 
summarised in Table 3(a-f).  Only the principal (generally those reporting first hand peer 
reviewed research) and/or ‘conflicting’ authors are cited in the table. 
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Table 3 
Environmental Externalities Associated with Commercial Fisheries in New Zealand 
 
(a) Habitat damage 
Externality Target fishery and 
cause 
Significance of externality Key reference 
Habitat damage: 
1. Dredging 
impacts on sea 
floor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Demersal 
trawling can 
damage the sea 
floor 
 
 Scallop dredging 
disturbs the sea bed 
 
 
 
 
 Oyster dredging 
 
 
 Snapper trawling 
 
 Orange roughy? 
 
Significant effect on 
substrate and therefore on 
associated species – 
reductions in species richness 
 
As above 
 
 
As above 
 
Unknown but likely effect on 
seamounts, etc. 
 
Thrush et al. 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
Cranfield & 
Michael (1998)  
 
Thrush et al. 
(1998) 
Probert (1996)  
 (b) Disruption to the food chain 
Externality Target fishery and 
cause 
Significance of externality Key reference 
Disruption to 
the food chain 
 Paddle crabs and rig 
– over harvesting one 
species without 
understanding affect on 
another(s) 
 Unknown but thought to 
be significant if too many rig 
are caught, i.e., paddle crabs 
multiply and are very small 
1980s Catch 
(c) Nonfish bycatch 
Externality Target fishery and 
cause 
Significance of externality Key reference 
Nonfish bycatch 
e.g., mainly 
seals, dolphins 
and birds in NZ 
waters 
 Tuna longline: affects 
on albatross and petrels; 
taking baits and crashing 
into gear 
 
 
 Jack mackerel mid 
and deep water trawls 
catching dolphins and 
seals in Taranaki 
 
 Southern squid 
fishery and sea lions – 
caught in trawls 
 
 Nearshore gillnet 
fisheries catching for 
kahawai and small sharks 
(i.e., rig, elephant fish, 
school shark and spiny 
dogfish) catching Hectors 
dolphins and yellow eyed 
penguin 
 On a global basis thought 
to be highly significant; likely 
to be significant for some NZ 
species  
 
 Highly significant for 
one company 
 
 
 
 Varies between years but 
significant conservation issue 
 
 Has been very significant 
around Banks Peninsula 
 Bergin (1997) 
and Baird 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 Baird (1998) 
 
 
 
 Baird (1998) 
 
 
 DoC and 
MAF (1994) 
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(d) Non target fish species bycatch 
Externality Target fishery and 
cause 
Significance of externality Key reference 
Non target fish 
species bycatch 
 Tuna long lining 
impacting on striped 
marlin.  Range – lack of 
awareness of 
stratification of fish 
species 
 
 Tuna long lining 
impacting on blue shark, 
caused by fishing in areas 
where sharks congregate 
 Equivalent to 
recreational catch, but 
unknown effect of fishery 
sustainability 
 
 
 Growing problem around 
the world.  Significance of 
impact unknown in New 
Zealand 
 Francis et al. 
(1998) 
 
 
 
(e) Discarding (also includes highgrading) 
Externality Target fishery and 
cause 
Significance of externality Key reference 
Discarding (also 
includes 
highgrading in 
some situations) 
 Middle depth and 
deepwater trawl – 
southern blue whiting, 
hoki, orange roughy and 
oreo – cause hard to 
identify but can be linked 
to size of catch, i.e., 
caused by burst nets 
owing to the large catch 
potential when fishing 
aggregations 
 
 Snapper fishery – 
both discarding and 
highgrading 
 Relatively low levels: 
impacts on other commercial 
fisheries and on discard fish 
stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Suggests 20-30% discard 
(trawling) and states (p23) 
that a study by Ministry of 
Fisheries has shown that 
highgrading is common in 
the snapper fishery-
particularly with longline 
fishers.  (Suggests hook 
changes to help prevent this) 
Clark et al. (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feldman (1996) 
(f) Marine pollution 
Externality Target fishery Significance of externality Key reference 
Marine pollution All fisheries – can be 
liquid wastes and solid 
wastes, e.g., packaging 
and pieces of nets which 
can impact on nonfish 
species; can also be 
dumping of processing 
waste 
 Slooten and 
Dawson (1995), 
Church (1998), 
Gregory (1998) 
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3.1 Types of Externalities 
 
The information in Table 3 indicates that most fishing techniques, on occasion, have 
associated externalities in New Zealand waters including and habitat damage : 
 
 bottom dredging causes invertebrate coral and habitat damage  
 bottom trawling causes invertebrate coral and habitat damage  
 mid water trawls can capture marine mammals  
 gillnets capture marine mammals and sometimes penguins 
 longlines can catch sea birds and non-target fish species. 
 
Table 4 provides a summary by fish stock. 
 
Marine pollution from a variety of sources can impact on fisheries (e.g., Church 1998:36) 
notes that some 50,000 tonnes of hoki offal are dumped into the sea each year by vessels 
fishing on the continental slope off the South Island West Coast.  Decomposing waste could 
locally deplete oxygen levels.  A preliminary assessment confirmed that enough waste 
reaches the sea floor to alter the species composition impact and on non-fish species (Slooten 
and Dawson 1995). 
 
There are at least two techniques that typically have minimal direct impact so long as catch 
limits/quotas are appropriately established. These are: 
 
 diving, e.g., for paua or kina 
 trapping, e.g., for blue cod or crayfish. 
 
3.2 Fisheries in which the externalities occur 
 
Tables 3 and 4 identify the target fisheries in which externalities are known to occur.  The 
main fisheries we have identified from the literature and from anecdotal knowledge are: 
 
 Oyster, Scallop: Bottom dredge.  The nature of this fishery/method is that externalities 
will occur wherever these fisheries are located. 
 Snapper, Orange Roughy: Trawl – bottom.  Externalities will occur anywhere the 
bottom is anything other than muddy.  
 Hoki, Oreo, Jack mackerel, Southern blue whiting, Southern squid: Trawl – mid 
water.  Externalities in these fisheries will only occur where there is the significant 
presence of non-fish species.  Kahawai and small sharks (i.e., rig, elephant fish, school 
shark and spiny dogfish): Gillnet - bottom set. Externalities in these fisheries will only 
occur where there is the significant presence of non-fish species. 
 Tuna: Long line. Externalities in this fishery will only occur where there is the 
significant presence of non-target fish species and non-fish species. 
 Paddle crab – trap.  The food chain (or dependent species) externality will only occur 
if this species is over-fished or if its predator (rig) is over-fished. 
 
While most fishing methods can have associated environmental externalities, it is clear that 
there are many fished stocks where externalities (perhaps other than marine pollution which 
to an extent must apply to all fisheries) are not recorded.  This could be for at least 3 reasons: 
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1. There are no significant externalities; 
2. There is insufficient data, for whatever reason, to indicate the presence of an 
externality - Slooten and Dawson (1995) suggest this is the case in a range of coastal 
gillnet and others fisheries; 
3. Some of the externality targets are not present in many fishing areas in significant 
numbers, e.g, key seabird species, seals and dolphins. 
 
3.3 Why the Externality Occurs 
 
We know to some extent about the possible causes of the externalities. In many instances, it 
is a combination of the catching device and its mode of operation in association with the 
presence of non-target fish species or some other value of concern, e.g., seabirds, marine 
mammals or important bottom habitat.  It is the combination of the mode of operation and 
presence of non-target fish species or some other value of concern that is particularly 
important as demonstrated in a number of papers, e.g., 
 
 Francis et al. (1998) reported that problems occur when the longlining for tuna does 
not adequately take account of the different depth distributions of tuna and non target 
species when the latter are present; 
 Bergin (1997) noted an initial lack of avoidance mechanisms was contributing to 
seabird bycatch in tuna longlining; 
 DoC and MAF (1994) identified ‘poor’ practice as contributing to the Hector’s 
dolphin bycatch problem in gillnets.  Ssee also Donoghue (1998); Baird (1998) 
reported a similar problem for one fishing company targeting jack mackerel and hoki 
off Taranaki with bottom and mid water trawling. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Ecological Significance of the Biophysical Environmental Externalities from Commercial Fishing in New Zealand 
 
Target 
Fishery 
Catch method Habitat 
damage 
Disruption to 
the food chain 
Nonfish 
bycatch 
Non target 
fish species 
bycatch 
Discarding 
(also includes 
highgrading 
Marine 
pollution 
Principal 
information 
source 
Oyster Bottom dredge 2  2    Thrush et al. (1998) 
Scallop Bottom dredge 2  2     
Snapper Trawl - bottom 2    1  Thrush et al. (1998) 
Orange Roughy Trawl - bottom 2    4  Probert (1996) 
Paddle crab or Rig Gillnet  1?      
Tuna Long line   2 2 (marlin: 
recreation) 
2 (blue shark)
  Baird (1998) 
Jack mackerel Trawl – mid 
water 
  1    Baird (1998) 
Southern squid Trawl   1    Baird (1998) 
Kahawai & small sharks 
(i.e., rig, elephant fish, 
school shark and spiny 
dogfish) 
Gillnet – 
bottom set 
  13    Slooten and 
Dawson (1995) 
Southern blue whiting Trawl – mid 
depth 
    4  Clark et al. (1998) 
Hoki Trawl – mid 
depth 
    4 2 Clark et al. (1998), 
Church (1998) 
Oreo Trawl – mid 
depth 
    4  Clark et al. (1998) 
Key to significance: 
1 = Known to be significant, based on peer reviewed published research findings 
2 = Externality demonstrated and potentially significant, but insufficient research to verify 
3 = Externality demonstrated but potentially not significant as there is insufficient research to verify 
4 = Externality demonstrated not to be significant, based on peer reviewed published research findings  
 = Problem declining 
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3.4 Significance of the Externality, Assessed Within the EIA Framework 
 
Where researchers have sometimes commented on the significance of an externality, it is 
usually only in general terms or with a plea for more research to determine the significance of 
the impact.  However, as can be noted from Table 3, a few researchers have made specific 
comments, often though related to a specific aspect of interest in the fishery.  Table 4 is a 
compilation of fisheries known to have externalities occurring, based on our evaluation of the 
significance of these externalities, from an ecological perspective.  We could have further 
subjected, based on our judgements from the literature, this information to analysis within our 
EIA framework.  Each of the key problem fisheries identified in table 4 could be evaluated 
individually (as per table 1) and then the findings from these compared.  We have not done 
this because we believe such an analysis should be based on use of a Delphi technique and 
that is beyond the brief and the resources for this project.  Such an approach would be 
somewhat similar to the notion of Comparative Risk Assessment (see Ministry for the 
Environment 1996).   
 
Fisheries with ‘significant’ externality problems appear to be: 
 
 Any bottom dredging fishery on a non silt/sand substrate, e.g., oyster and scallop; 
 Any bottom trawl fishery on a non silt/sand substrate, e.g., snapper and orange 
roughy; 
 Long line fisheries where there is the presence of non target fish species or seabirds in 
high numbers at the same fishing water level, e.g., tuna; 
 Mid water trawl fisheries where marine mammals are present in ‘significant’ numbers, 
e.g., southern squid; and 
 Gillnet fisheries where dolphins and yellow eyed penguins are present, e.g., rig and 
other small sharks and kahawai. 
 
Based on this evaluation, the most easily quantified (and best known) of these externalities in 
New Zealand waters appears to be ‘nonfish bycatch’, a problem associated with a number of 
fisheries.  We consider, however, that bottom trawling and dredging are the most serious 
long-term threats because: 
 
 Their impacts are likely to be long-lasting; 
 Their impacts will be multiple, i.e., food chain disruption and habitat loss and 
disturbance; 
 At first glance the problems appear difficult to avoid, remedy or mitigate.   
 The impacts are also very difficult to quantify in terms of their magnitude  (see for 
example Jones 1992, Thrush et al. 1998, Cranfield and Michael 1998).   
 
Consequently there is likely to be considerable debate between competing stakeholders about 
the size of the impact, management measures, etc.  A Delphi technique, incorporating 
multiple stakeholder input, might be a means of improving this form of analysis, were such 
an improvement considered necessary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNALISING 
 ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES IN FISHING 
 
 
 
4.1  Underlying Rationale for Internalising Externalities 
 
Negative externalities are costs imposed upon another person or firm where there is no 
contractual relationship between the two parties.  The term externality is also widely used to 
describe situations where there is damage caused to part of the natural environment as a 
consequence of economic activities, including in some instances by fishing.  In those cases 
costs are recognised by individuals who are concerned about the natural environment. 
 
Because of the absence of a contractual relationship between two parties, external costs can 
be ignored by the person or firm who creates them. The outcome is that inefficient levels of 
production or consumption occur as illustrated in Fig.1.  Externalities are shown by the 
vertical gap between Total Costs (TC) and Total Social Costs (TSC).  Fishing companies who 
focus solely on the costs they face may supply effort up to level E2 where total profits (Total 
Revenue (TR) minus Total Costs) are maximised. If external costs are recognised, the 
efficient level of effort to apply is E1 where Marginal Social Cost equals Marginal Revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Efficient Level of Fishing Effort 
 
Effort 
TR 
TC 
TSC 
E1     E2 
TR 
TC 
TSC 
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If fishing effort is identified as being at an inefficient level, actions can be proposed to 
internalise costs and reduce the externalities. Generally, externalities can only be reduced at 
some cost and there is an economically optimal level of externality reduction. The optimal 
level occurs where the marginal cost of externality reduction equals the marginal benefit from 
externality reduction (Pearce and Turner 1990). 
 
Internalisation occurs when the external costs associated with fishing are ‘recognised’ by the 
firm creating the externality. A key point is the need to change fishing companies’ behaviour 
or their fishing-related activities, to avoid, remedy, or mitigate externalities. This can occur if 
the firms creating the external costs take any of the actions listed below, resulting in reduced 
incidence of the externality creating behaviour: 
 
 Reduce or stop or change the pattern or timetabling of fishing in an area, or during 
certain times. 
 Change the fishing technologies used and their application – net size, hooks, lines, 
Bycatch Reduction Devices (BRD). 
 Apply more caution during fishing to reduce risk of polluting, or causing damage by 
fishing in multi species areas, or trawling the sea floor. 
 Change behaviour once fish have been caught and deal with non-target fish species, to 
reduce bycatch, and potential discards.  
 Change behaviour once non-target species have been caught and deal with them as 
effectively as possible to minimise the externality. 
 Invest in activities such as stock enhancement or habitat creation to offset the 
environmental effect. 
 
To address the above we have surveyed a wide range of international literature covering a 
broad spectrum of environmental management issues. 
 
4.2  Instruments for Internalising Environmental Externalities in Fishing 
 
Environmental externalities are associated with many economic activities and there is an 
extensive literature analysing types of externality, instruments for correcting externalities, 
and criteria for evaluating those instruments (Verhoef 1999). Our focus is on externalities 
associated with fishing but we commence this section with a listing of instruments of 
environmental policy adapted from Russell and Powell (1999, p309). 
 
1. Prohibition (of inputs, processes or products) 
2. Technological specification (for production, recycling or waste treatment) 
3. Technological basis for discharge standards 
4. Performance specification (discharge permits) 
5. Tradeable performance specification (tradeable permits) 
6. Pollution charges 
7. Subsidies 
 (i)  Lump sum for capital costs 
 (ii)  Marginal for desired results 
8. Liability law provisions 
9. Provision of information 
 (i)  To polluters (technical assistants) 
 (ii)  To investors, consumers, activists (eg US Toxics Release Inventory) 
 (iii)  To Consumers (green product or process) 
10. Challenge regulation and voluntary agreements. 
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This listing of instruments which have been developed to deal with pollution from land based 
firms illustrates there are many ways to respond to externalities. While some literature lumps 
all instruments into two categories - Market Based Incentives and Command and Control - 
that approach disguises the range and diversity of approaches possible. 
 
Fishing environmental externalities comprise a range of diverse events: marine pollution 
from ship’s discharges; bycatch of non-target fish species; damage and mortality to non-fish 
species; destruction of fish habitat. While all of these externalities are undesirable, in only 
some instances will they cause disastrous outcomes. If that is the case then society will 
typically tolerate some amount of the externalities. However in some instances society judges 
that fisheries externalities are unacceptable and strive to avoid them completely. The result is 
that in most cases society will find acceptable, instruments which reduce the level of 
externalities so long as the level achieved meets some minimum standards. Only in rare cases 
will society resort to instruments that target zero level of fisheries externality.  
 
Commercial fishing firms pursue profits, and their behaviour can be modified by many 
instruments to reduce the level of externalities associated with fishing toward a desired or 
optimal level. The pollution control instruments listed above hints there may also be an 
extensive list of instruments which could be used to tackle fishing externalities, and that is 
indeed the case. Potential means to achieve fisheries externality reductions include the 
following: 
 
 Information supply and education leading to voluntary actions. 
 Codes of practice leading to changes in behaviour of fishing firms. 
 Conservation easements. These devices bind companies to a set of conditions such as 
prohibition of fishing certain areas, or use of certain technologies. 
 Requirements to make offsets through habitat enhancement or stock enhancement 
 Regulations which specify: season; zone; technology; age and sex selectivity; 
retention and utilisation requirements; input limits; harvest limits. 
 Financial incentives: fines, taxes, subsidies, performance bonds etc, to change fishing 
company behaviour.  Note, these could be reduced fishing subsidies which reduce 
fishing effort and so less externality is created. 
 Rights based approaches: IQ, IVQ, ITQ, CDQ, territorial use rights which lead to 
change in behaviour and less externality created 
 Legal remedies. Fishing company whose actions create environmental damage may 
face claims for damages. 
 
Many of these instruments have been invoked and used in many countries, often in an attempt 
to reduce or prevent excessive harvesting of fish species. Some items on the list are used 
specifically to tackle fishing environmental externalities, others appear to have potential for 
use with internalising fisheries externalities. A large amount of literature exists exploring the 
effectiveness of various fisheries management policies and the requirements for their success 
(Anderson 1986, De Alessi 1998, Hanna 1997, OECD 1997). Our focus in this research is the 
effectiveness of approaches to internalise environmental externalities, and we briefly explore 
each of the approaches listed above. We report on instruments which have been used for 
pollution control or other non-fishing externalities, if the instruments appear to have some 
potential for use in fisheries management. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
REGULATORY APPROACHES 
 
 
 
Regulatory approaches can be developed which restrain fishing companies (Table 5). The 
intent of regulations is either: to stop fishing companies creating environmental effects by 
restricting how, or when, or how much they can fish; or instructing them how to perform 
once the environmental effect has occurred to minimise the damage that results. 
 
Some critics suggest that regulatory regimes for environmental protection are less efficient 
compared to financial incentives and are democratically illegitimate but this is not necessarily 
the case (Cole and Glossman 1999).  Critics of regulatory instruments are insensitive to the 
historical, technological and institutional contexts that can determine the comparative 
efficiency of alternative policy instruments. 
 
 
Table 5 
Summary of the Characteristics and Potential Application to Fishing of Regulatory 
Instruments 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to fishing 
No take zones 
 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
 No fishing in specified zones 
means externalities not created 
Marine 
Reserves 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas, habitat 
etc  
Banks Peninsula, Long Bay 
etc 
Area set aside for preservation 
of marine species 
Closed 
seasons, areas 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
Near sub Antarctic islands. No fishing during designated 
times and /or in prescribed 
areas. 
Size or sex 
selectivity 
Direct effort away from 
specified ages, sex 
individuals 
Rock lobster, size 
requirement 
Requirement for fishers to 
return to sea all prohibited 
catch 
Bycatch 
Reduction 
Devices -BRD 
Reduce rate of  bycatch 
of fish and other species 
Pingers on gill nets Vary technology used while 
fishing to reduce bycatch of 
fish or other species 
Technology 
ban 
Prevent externalities 
associated with specific 
harvesting technologies  
Drift netting ban, 
Vessel size limits 
Reduce bycatch by only 
allowing techniques which 
cause few externalities 
Input 
limitations 
Reduce externalities 
associated with number 
of potlifts, boat days etc 
 Reduce volume of fishing 
activity and associated 
externalities 
Catch 
limitations 
Reduce externalities 
associated with effort 
Foveaux Strait oysters Limit total harvesting and 
associated externalities 
Retention and 
utilisation 
requirements 
Reduce dumping of 
target and non -target 
species 
Catching Against Anothers 
Quota (CAAQ), Fishing 
Against Anothers Quota 
(FAAQ) 
Allow non target catch to be 
landed, not dumped 
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Closed Seasons, Zones, No take Zones, Marine Reserves 
 
One way to reduce environmental effects occurring is to introduce no take zones. A variant of 
that approach is time and area closures. These are widely used to restrict harvests of fish, but 
they can also be applied to deal with environmental externalities, including protecting 
juveniles, vulnerable populations, and non target bycatch (McGinn 1998). Closed areas can 
prevent fishing in bays where the at risk populations are predominant, and can protect 
juveniles of fast growing species. Equally importantly closed seasons and closed areas can 
protect marine mammals and other non target species during fishing operations. Alaskan 
groundfishing, New Zealand squid fishing and other fisheries have closed times and zones to 
protect seals, sea lions and other species (OECD 1997, Hansford 1999, Fujita et al. 1998). 
Marine reserves have been established at twelve coastal locations in New Zealand, to provide 
no-take zones and protect habitat and inshore species from commercial harvesting.  Similarly 
marine mammal sanctuaries (established under the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1977) 
have been implemented around the Auckland Islands and around Banks Peninsula to protect 
marine mammals from fishery impacts. 
 
Closed seasons and areas require gazetting of the dates and regions where the ban on fishing 
applies. Their effectiveness as a means to reduce biological externalities is highly dependent 
on the importance of the time or zone protected for the at risk species. Generally, the 
effectiveness of this measure is determined by the extent to which it is able to separate the 
species to be protected from the fishing activity.  If the fishing exclusion zone is a relatively 
small part of the habitat for the mammal species, then it will provide relatively little 
protection unless fish congregate there at specific times or are particularly vulnerable there. 
Excluding fishers for a time period, or from a region may displace the fishing effort to 
another time period or region, and the total level of biological effect will only be reduced if 
the displaced fishing causes less harm than original fishing. In some instances it may be 
possible to establish a marine reserve, and attain a ‘double dividend’ of increased population 
numbers within the reserved area and increased harvests in the harvested area. A key 
requirement for this to occur is for the gain in dispersal from the reserved area to exceed the 
harvest loss from the old pre-reserve area (Sanchirico and Wilen 1998). 
 
Implementation of closed seasons and zones may appear to be a simple matter of gazettal, but 
local political pressure can make their introduction a protracted affair. However surveillance 
can be costly if fishers are unwilling to accept the closures and enforcement actions are 
needed to make the bans effective. 
 
Closures can be accompanied by size and sex selectivity measures, and by gear and vessel 
restrictions. In New Zealand waters, Hookers Sea lions calving near Sub Antarctic islands are 
protected from trawlers by a combination of area closures, and fishing operation restrictions 
(Baird 1998).  
 
Marine reserves have recently been hailed by North American writers as likely to bring many 
ecological benefits. Their introduction is touted as necessary to reverse the trends of declining  
fish stocks which occur in many of the world’s fishing areas (Clark 1999, Lauck et al. 1998). 
The attractions of closed areas and marine reserves include their apparent simplicity and 
ability to overcome fishing externalities. As noted in the paragraphs above the biological and 
economic effects of introducing these areas are dynamic, and can be complex. The downside 
of this approach are the potentially large losses in output due to the closure. 
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Size or Sex Selectivity, BRD 
 
Fishing effort is directed at target species, but fishing technology is imperfect and bycatch is 
a widespread problem particularly in multi-species fisheries (Unwin and James 1998, OECD 
1997, Hanna 1999). Bycatch may include fish, mammals, birds, shellfish, corals and plants. 
Fishing technology can be modified in attempt to reduce bycatch of non-target fish species 
which often have high mortality rates among fish returned to the sea. Bycatch Reduction 
Devices (BRD) have been developed to reduce the likelihood of capturing some non target 
species. Regulations can be introduced which require fishing firms to use more selective 
fishing technologies, to return to the sea protected individuals (size, sex), or to use BRD 
(Bergin 1997, Broadhurst et al. 1997, Hall 1997, Rogers et al. 1997). 
 
Fishing technology can also be modified to select larger sizes. Size and sex selectivity can be 
pursued by introducing minimum or maximum sizes, and penalties for possession of 
undersized or oversized specimens respectively, or of spawning females.  Minimum size 
regulations provide a financial incentive to target larger specimens. The objective of size and 
sex selectivity measures is to tackle growth and recruitment overfishing. Allowing young fish 
to grow to larger size before capture may increase the productivity of a fishery. Allowing fish 
to grow to a larger size may increase spawning rates, and hence increase recruitment into the 
fishery. 
 
The effectiveness of BRD has been examined in several studies (Bergin 1997, Hall 1997, 
Broadhurst et al. 1997, Rogers et al. 1997), covering prawn fisheries, squid fisheries, tuna 
fisheries, etc. These studies often report a clear tradeoff between bycatch reduction and 
increased CPUE for the target species.  
 
The ability of size and sex selectivity measures to conserve fish stocks is often quite limited. 
Captured fish are often damaged by contact with fishing gear, measurement, and release. 
Limitations to effectiveness include variability of growth rates between individuals, and 
between regions. The presence of multiple species limits the effectiveness of mesh size to 
prevent capture of juveniles, if species vary in size and growth rates. Migratory species will 
be caught at different ages and sizes at different locations on their migration path. These 
factors are likely to make fishers unwilling to accept size selective gear limitations. 
 
Technology Bans 
 
One strategy which has been widely used during the past decade is the banning of certain 
technologies. Drift netting and longlining are two well known examples of technologies 
which have been banned by many countries because of their destructiveness to non target 
species.  
 
Input Quantity and Catch Limitations 
 
Reductions in total level of fishing days, pot lifts and net sets can be directed at reducing the 
level of externalities through reduction in the level of effort applied to fishing. Similarly 
regulations can be introduced which limit total harvest with the intention of controlling the 
amount of environmental effect which occurs. 
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Retention and Utilisation Requirements 
 
Several authors report estimates of the level of discarding in fisheries (McGinn 1998, Hanna 
1999). Regulations could require fishing companies to land all fish caught, and outlaw 
discarding of catch. This approach forces fishing companies to partially recognise the 
externalities associated with their fishing. Where fishing companies also are required to hold 
quota for all species caught, mechanisms may be needed to facilitate the landing of non target 
species. Leasing of quota (Fishing Against Another Quota (FAAQ)), and Catching Against 
Anothers Quota (CAAQ) are ways to accomplish that. These approaches have been used in 
New Zealand (Boyd and Dewees 1992, Annala 1996).  
 
Regulation of Behaviour Towards Non Target Capture 
 
Sea mammals, turtles, birds and other species are accidentally captured during fishing. 
Fishing companies can be regulated to minimise the damage which occurs by treating non 
target species as humanely as possible. Albatross, sea lion and seals, can be released from 
some fishing operations before they are too severely damaged or killed. Hall (1997) reports 
that tuna fishers have been required to separate tuna from dolphins, and to search for ways to 
prevent dolphins herding, through use of sound, chemical and other repellents. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
A range of economic or financial approaches can be applied to fisheries management (Table 
6). 
 
Table 6 
Summary of the Characteristics of Financial Instruments and their Potential 
Application of Fisheries Management 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to  fishing 
Charger Provide incentive to 
reduce, eg, pollution 
Conservation 
Services Levy, 
applied to some 
non-fish bycatch 
Apply tax to variable inputs, 
boats, outputs, to reduce profits 
and externalities 
Subsidies Reduce costs of 
inputs 
R&D assistance Reduce costs of developing 
BRD 
Environmental 
performance 
bonds 
Provide financial 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities  
Mining, 
biodiversity 
protection 
Provide incentive to not damage 
habitat or marine ecosystem 
Financial 
inducements 
Bribe to behave in 
desired way 
 Financial reward if do not create 
environmental externalities 
Rights based    
IQ, ITQ, IVQ 
CDQ, Share 
fisheries 
Reduce race to fish NZ QMS Creation of rights reduces need 
to race, provides incentive to 
maintain asset, so less 
externalities created 
 
 
 
Charger 
 
Fishing companies can be provided financial incentives to reduce the externalities they 
produce. Fines provide punishment for firms which create externalities. Charger for 
externalities can provide continuing incentives to reduce the level of externality created.  
Subsidies can be provided to encourage firms to adopt different technologies or practices 
which reduce the level of externalities. Firms which create externalities might be required to 
fund offsetting actions such as stock enhancement. 
 
Financial incentives have long been hailed as potential means to achieve internalisation of 
externalities, particularly when the externality involves air or water pollution. Economists 
have frequently pointed to the superiority of some financial incentives over regulatory 
approaches to manage externalities. Pollution charges for example are argued to achieve 
reduction in emissions at lower cost than will regulations. Pollution charges provide 
continuing incentives to firms to reduce emissions, and can collect revenue for government. 
Despite the claimed superiority of pollution charges they are not widely used to control 
externalities. Reasons for their light use include the difficulty of setting (and modifying) 
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pollution charges to achieve target levels of pollution, the difficulty of monitoring emissions 
levels from sources, the lack of precise knowledge of marginal abatement costs, and industry 
opposition to their use. Some of these problems can be overcome for example by monitoring 
firm’s use of inputs such as fossil fuels and levying pollution charges on measured inputs 
rather than outputs. Opposition by industry to another charger which may reduce profitability, 
and affect their international competitiveness could be overcome by government reducing 
other taxes in the economy. But the problem of selecting the appropriate charger level 
remains, and trial and error is needed to determine how firms respond to charger. 
 
Fishing companies in New Zealand already pay substantial tax on diesel used for fuel, and in 
principle the tax could be increased to achieve a reduction in externalities. But this seems to 
provide a very crude way to motivate fishing companies to reduce fishing environmental 
externalities which are much more closely linked to fishing area, timing and type of 
equipment used than to quantity of diesel used. 
 
Subsidies 
 
Rather than relying upon blunt charger to change fishing company behaviour, sharper 
financial devices can be proposed. Subsidies are an alternative to taxes or charges and may 
have some potential for use in fisheries. Fish attracting devices (FAD) have been developed 
in tuna fisheries in an attempt to find alternatives to sets on dolphins (Hall 1998), and FAD 
and R&D for new or improved FAD could be subsidised by government. Examples of the use 
of these approaches are not easily found. 
 
Environmental performance bonds  
 
Environmental performance bonds are a relatively recent addition to the arsenal of devices 
for managing environmental externalities. Firms whose activities have potential to create 
environmental externalities can be required to deposit a sum which will be forfeited if they 
infringe the agreed environmental standard associated with their activity. Use of 
environmental performance bonds has become quite common during the past fifteen years, 
and they are used with mountaineering expeditions, mining companies, tourist vessels and 
others to ensure that sites do not get degraded by their actions (Shogren et al. 1993). 
Environmental performance bonds have potential for use with fishing operations, particularly 
when they involve fishing in environmentally sensitive areas.  
 
Fishing firms which create externalities might be required to fund offsetting actions such as 
stock enhancement. There is a need to monitor to determine if firms are 'going through the 
motions' or are genuinely creating new stock. The key requirement for this approach to 
succeed is monitoring by fishery managers to detect companies who destroy fish habitat or 
cause some other environmental infringement.  
 
Financial Inducements 
 
Fujita et al. (1998) report the Alaska Marine Conservation Council has proposed that ‘clean 
fishers’ who have low bycatch rates, be granted greater initial allocations of harvest quotas, a 
financial incentive for lower levels of externality. This approach will require monitoring to 
determine which firms have lower bycatch rates and its effectiveness is dependent upon the 
elasticity of supply of clean fishing. 
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Rights Approaches: IQ, IVQ, ITQ, CDQ, Territorial Use Rights 
 
An externality arises in fishing due to the race to fish, which occurs when fishing firms lack 
secure rights to the stock.  Racing can result in disregard for future harvests, other fish 
species, habitat, and non-fish species.  Rights approaches aim to reduce the incentive to race 
by providing more secure property rights to fishers. There are a wide range of rights 
approaches which have been used or proposed to manage fishing including: Territorial Use 
Rights for Fishing (TURFs); Individual Quota (IQ), Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ), 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), and Community Development Quota (CDQ). The detail 
of those schemes vary on who is able to own the rights and their tradability, but the key 
feature common to all is the creation of rights to harvest fish within a defined area.  
 
Rights approaches are used by many countries to manage fishing and are generally judged to 
be successful at reducing the race to fish (OECD 1993).  There is still reason to be concerned 
about bycatch, discards, non-fish capture, habitat damage and other environmental effects in 
fisheries with rights based management. There is some ability to reduce discard and bycatch 
problems in multi species fisheries, if rights holders have or can readily obtain landing rights 
for many species.  In some fisheries territorial use rights have been developed which provide 
limitations on entry, and encourage husbanding of the resource (McGinn 1998, Young 1999). 
But there is clear evidence that external environmental effects occur in rights based fisheries 
(PCE 1999) and these require targeted policies of the types listed above. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 
 
 
 
Hitherto, many societies have viewed oceans as vast fishery frontiers. These frontiers are 
suffering depletion and straining the limits of sustainability. The challenge is to develop 
sustainable governance systems through institutional transformation (Hanna 1997).  The 
institutional capital needed for sustainable fisheries governance is comprised of several 
pieces: 
 
 A perception of the fishery as an integrated ecosystem 
 An identification of stakeholders 
 An allocation of decision making power and responsibility which vests all interests 
and internalises the source of control amongst stakeholders 
 Incentive structures which promote long-term management skills among fishery 
interests 
 Management processes that promote adaptability to change. 
 
Many societies have historically relied on state regulation, usually through controls on inputs 
into the fishing process, such as limited entry licensing, gear restrictions, and fishing ground 
closures to mitigate detrimental environmental impacts associated with commercial fishing.  
Such input controls do little to avoid a 'race for fish' situation, resulting in unsustainable 
fishing practices.  Their modest overall level of success has prompted policy makers to look 
for alternative solutions (see Table 7).  One such approach is by encouraging greater 
stakeholder participation in fisheries management in a collaborative manner (co-
management).  Other alternative approaches include codes of practice, accredited 
environmental management systems and conservation easements.  
 
 
Table 7 
Summary of the Characteristics of Voluntary Instruments 
and their Potential Application of Fisheries Management 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ 
uses 
Applicability to  fishing 
Co management Right holders draw up 
operating systems 
Challenger 
Scallop 
Peer agreements reduce 
externalities 
Codes of practice Agreed behaviour 
which limits 
externalities  
HSNO, Agchem Industry develop, adopt, codes 
which limit or preclude 
externalities 
Accredited 
environmental 
management 
systems 
Industry develops 
systems - externally 
audited prior to 
accreditation 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council, ISO 
14001 
Industry develop, adopt, 
systems with environmental 
policy which aims to limit or 
preclude externalities 
Conservation 
easements 
Negotiated agreements 
restricting a parties 
behaviour 
QEII Trust, 
Ducks Unlimited 
Negotiated agreement to not 
take certain actions eg create 
externalities 
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Co-Management 
 
The term co-management (or co-operative management) is used here broadly to describe 
systems that encourage co-operation and mutualism. The significance of such approaches 
may have been little understood and appreciated until recently (Berkes 1989).  
Co-management presents a new challenge to our way of thinking about the management of 
natural resources. 
 
Co-management shares management responsibility between the state and local communities 
or resource user groups.  Such arrangements can range along a continuum from self-
management to advisory management. By including a range of stakeholder input and values, 
co-management has the potential to transform the current extractive and single-species 
management focus to a more sustainable, ecosystem-based approach.  Such an approach 
would recognise the marine environment as an ecosystem linked to the land and air, not just a 
'fish basket' for human consumptive purposes (Wallace 1997). 
 
A basic principle of co-management is self-governance within a legal framework established 
by government (Jentoft and McCay 1995). For its part, government must be willing to share 
this responsibility with stakeholders (Pinkerton 1989). 
 
Co-management provides a number of potential benefits for marine management, including 
the problem of managing environmental externalities (Table 8).  Bringing different 
stakeholder groups together to communicate helps these groups to both redefine their own 
problems, and to gain understandings of the problems of other groups.  Shared solutions 
become more likely and conflict less likely, as previously fixed preferences can change when 
different groups articulate their interests together (Healey 1993; Young 1995). 
 
The inclusion of stakeholders within a management process can provide a wider base of 
information and knowledge, particularly in respect of local and regional fish patterns, and the 
identification of key issues. 
 
Legitimacy of any regime is essential to encourage fishers and other marine stakeholders to 
voluntarily advance their collective interests at the partial expense of their private interests.  
By involving different stakeholders in the management process, and by establishing a pattern 
of co-operation based on reciprocity, co-management has the potential to enhance legitimacy.  
Increased legitimacy is also likely to procure increased levels of compliance with rules and 
regulations (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994). 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the opportunity for participation in decision-making should 
encourage stakeholders to see themselves as collective managers or stewards of the resource.  
This may provide the incentive for adopting sustainable fishing practices, and for action in 
conservation spheres such as habitat protection and rehabilitation.  At its most 
fully-developed, the co-management process should see stakeholders take an ecological 
approach to management rather than focusing purely on single species management. 
 
Whether the benefits of co-management will be realised will depend on a number of factors, 
including the institutional design of any fisheries co-management regime.  There is no single 
right way to design and implement a co-management agreement (Pinkerton 1994). However, 
certain factors can be identified as predictors of success, which can cumulatively contribute 
to the realisation of the benefits of co-management benefits.  These factors are presented in 
Table 9. 
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Other factors may influence successful co-management.  Firstly, co-management tends to 
operate more favourably when stakeholder groups already have a cohesive social system.  
Valuable social capital may accompany such social cohesion, including the presence of social 
norms against resource misuse, the likelihood of reciprocal behaviour patterns, and effective 
means of social sanctioning of rule transgressors (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1989).  Secondly, 
co-management is likely to be more easily implemented if there is already a degree of trust 
amongst the various stakeholder groups (Jentoft 1989).  Thirdly, other exogenous factors may 
be important, such as having a facilitative political mechanism, and the absence of strong 
external threats to the legitimacy of the co-management agreement (Ostrom 1992; Pinkerton 
1989).  
 
Various forms of co-operative stakeholder groups have been established in the fisheries 
sector along a continuum of co-management.  Hughey et al. (2000) has classified these into 
three categories: self-management, co-management and advisory management (Table 10).  
New Zealand has a range of co-operative management approaches, only some of which 
explicitly recognise the importance of environmental externalities (e.g., Bathgate and Memon 
1998; Hughey et al. 2000). For some individual fish species stakeholder companies which 
represent ITQ owners have formed, e.g. the Challenger Enhancement Scallop Company. For 
some other species advisory groups including commercial and recreational fishers, iwi and 
environmental groups have formed, e.g. the PAU 5 working group. In other circumstances, 
multi species/ecosystem based groups have formed, e.g. Guardians of Fiordland's Fisheries. 
The latter two types of groups advise the Ministry of Fisheries on appropriate management.  
 
 
Table 8 
Potential Benefits of Co-Management 
 
Consensual, democratic  decision making 
 
Reduced stakeholder conflict 
 
Broader resource knowledge 
 
Better, more equitable regulations 
 
Increased legitimacy 
 
Increased compliance 
 
Greater stewardship by resource users 
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Table 9 
Institutional Design Factors for Successful Co-Management  
(Source: adapted from Pinkerton 1994). 
 
1. Clear boundaries 
 
2. Clear membership criteria 
 
3. Appropriate scale management units 
 
4. Clear interception agreements 
 
5. Local all-stakeholder co-management boards 
 
6. Coordinating regional management board 
 
7. A degree of local control 
 
8. Clear definition of local powers 
 
9. Protocols and rules that promote multi-party collaboration 
 
 
 
 
There are many examples around the world of fisheries co-management, but the focus of 
these arrangements is typically on entry, harvest rates, seasons, technologies, to reduce the 
risks and ensure sustainability of fisheries.  The potential for co-operation under co-
management between fishers in Japan, Netherlands and Denmark was found to be highest 
where fisheries are relatively homogenous with non-migratory species (OECD 1997).  Multi-
species fisheries which have a range of fishing technologies and variable seasons are more 
prone to disagreements.  Fishers can be provided incentives to join co-management groups, 
e.g., in Netherlands were granted 10 percent more fishing days and the possibility of renting 
or hiring quota within a year (OECD 1997). Seventy percent of fisher respondents in the 
Netherlands state ‘they are more inclined to follow group rules than rules imposed by the 
government’ (OECD 1997). 
 
There is an argument that democratic cooperation systems may result in higher discount rates 
being applied, and less willingness to take actions with long term implications such as 
conservation.  If participants are risk averse and have little certainty over their future access 
to fish stocks they may vote today for continued harvest rather than conservation (OECD 
1997).  
 
Codes of practice  
 
Codes of practice may be described as a particular variant of a co-management agreement. A 
code of practice is a document negotiated and agreed by interested stakeholders on best 
practice for a particular industry (Stevens 1999).  Codes cover the range from educational 
documents to codes that are enforced through regulation.  There is a wealth of topics covered 
by codes, including codes specifically aimed at preventing or reducing environmental 
externalities (Caddy 1999). These codes can be developed by industry participants with and 
without input from government and external parties.  
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FAO has recently provided international leadership in developing fisheries codes of practice 
that…' set out principles and international standards of behaviour for responsible practices … 
with due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity' (FAO 2000).  FAO has published nine 
technical guidelines in support of the implementation of such codes.  Several nations and 
regions have complemented the action of the FAO by publishing their own codes of conduct 
for responsible seafood industry. 
 
The Marine Stewardship Council (http://www.msc.org/) is a charitable, not for profit, non-
governmental, international organisation set up to promote sustainable fisheries and 
responsible fishing practices worldwide, through developing long term, market based 
solutions, which meet the needs and objectives of both the environment and commerce. 
 
Central to the purpose of the MSC are its Principles and Criteria (i.e. Standard) for 
Sustainable Fishing, against which independent certification companies may certify fisheries, 
on a voluntary basis.  Fish from certified fisheries and fisheries stakeholders are then eligible 
to use the MSC logo, which conveys to consumers the assurance that the fish or fish product 
is from a well managed and sustainable fishery and that it has been fished responsibly.  The 
MSC lists many international companies and organisations amongst its members but nothing 
from New Zealand, as yet. 
 
In New Zealand, both the Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997 and 
the Hazardous Substance and New Organisms Act (1996) refer to codes of practice.  The 
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or the Environmental Risk 
Management Authority can issue a code as a method for implementing requirements of 
regulations under the relevant Act.  Although these codes may have significant industry input 
and do address environmental externalities, these are not voluntary codes, and are essentially 
regulatory methods. 
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Table 10 
Characteristics and Examples of Stakeholder Involvement Contributing to Fisheries Management 
 
Types of groups Self management 
 
Co-management 
 
Advisory management 
 
 CONTINUUM OF CLASSIFICATION 
 
Definition Fishers decide on own operating regime 
but within a framework established by 
government that applies to all fisheries. 
Equal sharing of power and decision 
making responsibility between 
government and stakeholders. 
Government facilitates most aspects of 
management and sets rules but liaises/ 
consults closely with stakeholders. 
Criteria  Self funded 
 Self managed and facilitated 
 Largely self compliant 
 Seeking self control 
 Largely government funded 
 Shared management and facilitation 
 Largely reliant on government 
compliance 
 Seeking shared management 
 Government funded 
 Government managed and facilitated 
 Reliant on government compliance 
 Trying to influence change/ lobbying 
Voluntary or Facilitated Voluntary                                           
Facilitated 
Voluntary                                           
Facilitated 
Voluntary                                           
Facilitated 
New Zealand example and 
position on continuum 
Challenger Scallop  
Enhancement Company  
(Hughey et al. 1998) 
Guardians of Fiordland’s 
Fisheries (Hughey et al. 1998) 
 
 
Rock Lobster  
Industry Council 
PAU 5 management  
group (Bathgate and  
Memon 1998) 
Australian example and 
position on continuum 
(AFMA (Kaufmann and  
Geen 1997)) 
Northern Prawn 
Fishery Management 
Advisory Committee 
 
Torres Strait Fisheries 
Management Committee 
(Council for State of the 
Environment in Australia 1996) 
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Participation in Australia 
and New Zealand 
ITQ owners: commercial fishers and 
some processors 
Ranging from ITQ owners/ fishers/ 
processors, but also includes scientists, 
government, and community interests 
Likely to be broad but ranging from ITQ 
owners/ fishers/ processors, to also 
include scientists, government, and 
community interests 
International example and 
position on continuum 
 
 
Lake Titicaca, Peru 
 (Le Vieil and Orlove 1990); 
 
Reef management by  
clan chiefs in the  
South Pacific (Johannes 1981) 
Village multi-sector  
cooperatives in Japan  
(Lim et al. 1995) 
British Columbia Halibut  
fishery (Grafton, pers.  
comm.) 
Source: Based on the continuum notion of Pinkerton (1994)
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Codes of practices which attempt to address environmental externalities have been developed 
in the agricultural and aquaculture sectors in New Zealand.  Three examples are the Code of 
Practice for the Management of Agrichemicals (NZS 8409), the Code of Practice for 
Fertiliser Use (NZFMRA, 1998) and the Mussel Industry Council Environmental Code of 
Practice (1999).  The impetus for these codes has come from the Resource Management Act.  
All three codes have a stated purpose of satisfying s. 17 of the RMA which states a duty to 
avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse environmental effects from activities associated with the 
industry. 
 
The Code of Practice for the Management of Agrichemicals has the objective of providing 
practical and specific guidance on the safe, responsible and effective use of agrichemicals.  It 
has a formal nationwide training programme associated with it and became a NZ Standard in 
1995.  It is referred to many resource management plans produced by regional councils in 
relation to agrichemical use.  The Code now has a formal Accreditation Programme 
associated with it (GROWSAFE®) which audits compliance with code requirements.   
 
The other two codes are voluntary codes and have adopted a different approach to the 
standard-based approach used in the agrichemical code.  Both codes place emphasis on self-
monitoring and self-audit whereby companies or individuals operating under the Code are 
required to measure and assess environmental effects associated with their activities.  In the 
mussel industry, the Mussel Industry Council carries out monitoring requirements of the 
code.  An impetus for both codes was the avoidance of strict regulation by regional councils 
of day-to-day activities through resource consent conditions.  In addition, it is important to 
the long-term viability of the industries that they are perceived as “environmental 
responsible” in part because of the public nature of resource consent processes under the 
RMA.  In comparison to the agrichemical code, neither the mussel or fertiliser code has a 
requirement for external audit or penalties for non-compliance. 
 
A lack of publicly available audits or evaluations is a problem common to many such 
approaches.  Government could signal a requirement for mandatory reporting of all such 
approaches and provide a standard against which such reports could be prepared.  The Triple 
Bottom Line approach (see for example Buchanan 1998) could be one means of getting 
companies to report on economic, environmental and social aspects.  Hubbards, the cereal 
company, is one of the first New Zealand companies, to commit itself to this approach (“The 
Press” 22/3/2000). 
 
There is debate about the extent to which voluntary codes of practice are properly evaluated 
(Slooten and Dawson 1995).  The Mussel Industry Environmental Code of Practice and the 
Code of Practice for Fertiliser Use have been well received by members of the respective 
industries and noted as positive actions by regional councils (Marlborough District Council 
1997, Environment Waikato 1999).  However, their success at addressing environmental 
externalities cannot yet be quantified, given that they are very recent initiatives.  Where the 
effects of an industry are easily observed and attributable to a single industry, such as mussel 
rope tie material deposited on beaches, it will be relatively straightforward to measure the 
success of a code at addressing an externality.  However, where the size and cause of an 
externality are not clear, as is the case with many of the fishing externalities identified in 
Section 2, assessing whether codes are successful will not be straightforward.   
 
There are limited examples of comparable initiatives in the fisheries sector in New Zealand. 
Existing Fisheries Management Agreements (FMA) could potentially be modified to include 
codes of practice directed at avoidance of externalities, e.g., fishing companies could agree to 
 35
cease fishing for a species while spawning is occurring to ensure satisfactory number of 
juveniles.  The PAU 5 working group developed a harvesting code of practice in 1994. 
 
Environmental Management Systems 
 
Environmental management systems are an alternative voluntary approach that is closely 
related to codes of practice.  There is obvious overlap between the style of the mussel and 
fertiliser codes with environmental management systems.  Environmental management 
systems, particularly those accredited to the ISO 14000 standards, are viewed as an 
instrument for ensuring access to international markets, given the possibility that market 
access requirements can include environmental concerns (TradeNZ, undated).  Ensuring 
market access is a potential benefit environmental management systems and codes of 
practice, although not yet strong enough, should not be overlooked as a driver for voluntary 
methods.  Unlike its European equivalent (EMAS), the ISO 14000 standard does not include 
mandatory public reporting of environmental performance. 
 
Conservation Easements 
 
Easements are used in several countries to achieve various land use objectives. An obvious 
example is for an organisation such as Ducks Unlimited to take an easement over an area of 
land to achieve a biodiversity protection objective (Anderson 1998). The easement is a charge 
against the title for the area of land, and prescribes the specific activity or outcome to be 
achieved. There is no title to areas of sea, but quota holders do own property rights. An 
organisation could obtain a title against those property rights and restrain the quota holder 
from taking environmentally damaging actions?  The key requirements for this approach to 
be used in the marine environment must be determined. 
 
New Zealand’s Conservation Act 1987 includes provision for agreements between property 
owners and the Department of Conservation.  At their most formal level these Conservation 
Covenants are registered against the title of the land and require certain actions to be met by 
the negotiating parties.  A lesser measure, A Letter of Agreement, enables conservation to 
happen but without legal remedy in the case of default. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
LEGAL REMEDIES 
 
 
 
In many spheres of life two or more parties can negotiate over use of resources and reach 
agreements which are acceptable to both. If there is dispute between two parties over use of 
resources they can seek to resolve their dispute by way of court action. A party who believes 
they have been wronged by another can seek damages to compensate them for the injury 
suffered. An example to illustrate the operation of this approach is as follows. Two firms are 
sited on the bank of a river and one firm discharges BOD into the river. The second firm is 
sited downstream of the firm which discharges the BOD material, and relies upon the river to 
provide a source of clean water for its business. The downstream firm incurs costs because of 
the discharges by firm upstream, and may seek damages to compensate for the loss suffered. 
Obtaining award of damages will require proving that the emitter did discharge BOD and had 
an obligation not to do so, that the complainant holds property rights to clean water and that 
loss has indeed been incurred.  
 
Law in some countries has been strengthened by including definitions of liability and strict 
liability which increase the likelihood of complainants winning damages claims. The 
incentive underlying tort law and damages claims is that firms and individuals will recognise 
the possibility of damages claims, and act prudently to avoid or reduce the possibility of such 
claims succeeding. However, the potential of this instrument to curb fisheries externalities 
seems to be limited by the need for complainants to show they have well defined rights to 
undisturbed habitat, or to harvest levels, and that these rights have been damaged by some 
fishing related activity (Table 11). 
 
 
Table 11 
Summary of the Characteristics of Legal Instruments and their  
Potential Application of Fisheries Management. 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to  
fishing 
Tort law Liability for 
pollution damages 
RMA is a 'strict 
liability' law 
Potential damages 
claims provide 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities 
 
 37
CHAPTER 9 
 
EDUCATION AND INFORMATION SUPPLY 
 
 
 
This approach can aim to provide information to members of the fishing industry in the belief 
that better informed fishers will cease or reduce the level of externality creating behaviour 
(see Table 12 for a summary of instruments). The approach requires effort to capture, report 
and distribute information to fishing companies. Workshops may be required to reinforce the 
ideas and achieve buy in by industry participants.  
 
The effectiveness of this mechanism will be determined by the willingness of industry 
participants to accept the information provided, recognise the case for change, and adhere to 
responsible behaviour. Incentives such as financial penalties can also be provided which 
reinforce responsible behaviour (OECD 1997). Effectiveness is likely to be higher where 
there are known stable groups of fishers who are likely to be self monitoring, and less 
effective where the converse occurs (Acheson et al. 1998).  
 
One variant of the information supply approach is to place observers on fishing vessels who 
collect information on bycatch rates, inform skippers, who then voluntarily move to a new 
fishing location when bycatch rates become excessive (Fujita et al. 1998, Caddy 1999).  
Fujita et al. (1998) note that skippers require access to real time data on bycatch rates to be 
able to respond, and when observers began to withhold that information the system broke 
down. It is crucial for the success of this approach that industry personnel have confidence in 
the validity of the information available on the environmental effect. 
 
Some examples of the types of externalities where this approach has been employed include: 
 
 Agreement not to sail between Poor Knights Island and the North Island, to reduce the 
chances of marine pollution from oil discharges.  
 Production of an Australian fishing conditions handbook, in Japanese – Catch fish not 
birds (Bergin 1997). 
 
 
Table 12 
Summary of the Characteristics of Education Instruments and their 
Potential Application of Fisheries Management 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to 
fishing 
Publications, 
guides, kits, etc 
numerous Numerous, e.g., 
biodiversity 
protection 
Informed people change 
behaviour, not create 
externalities 
Informal regulation 
e.g., environmental 
reporting 
Toxics Release 
Inventory and corporate 
environmental reporting
 Information release plus 
community pressure, 
modifies firm behaviour
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Informal regulation including environmental reporting 
 
Information supply strategies may also be directed at consumers, investors and activists. The 
notion behind this approach is that communities have an ability to pressure businesses into 
changing behaviour if there is a gap between actual and community desired behaviour. The 
community is perceived as providing informal regulation of the industry which creates the 
externality. This is the most recent approach developed to tackle pollution and has been 
subjected to some research to discern its effectiveness. In the US there are mandated 
disclosures of toxic releases via the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Pargal et al. (1999) 
examine whether there is evidence of informal regulation effecting a variety of emissions in 
USA and Indonesia. They find very strong evidence that informal regulatory forces are 
pervasive in both countries, and that community incomes have a powerful negative 
association with pollution intensity (Pargal et al. 1999, p.6).  
 
These reductions in pollution are believed to occur because citizens and investors are well 
informed about emissions levels and, particularly in higher income areas, exert pressure on 
firms in their region. Konar and Cohen (1997) have shown that firms which take the largest 
stock price hit after release of TRI data were more likely to cut down those discharges 
relative to other firms in their industries, than were the largest emitters in their industry, or a 
random sample of firms.  
 
Could a similar approach be used to reduce fisheries externalities? Where fishing companies 
are locally based, identifiable, and credible information is readily available about the 
externalities each firm creates, it is plausible that informal regulation will be effective. An 
active policy of collecting and releasing information will be an essential requirement for the 
instrument to be effective. This new approach to control of externalities seems worthy of 
further investigation in a fisheries context. 
 
Corporate Environmental Reporting is one means that companies could use to disclose their 
environmental record.  Over the last 10 years, an increasing number of companies 
internationally (though few in NZ) are choosing to move from a mention of the environment 
in the regular annual report, to producing a specific stand-alone corporate environmental 
report (CER). 
 
Currently there is no standard for CER.  Some initiatives are aiming to raise the standard and 
increase the degree of comparability between reports.  Best known are the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) and the International Benchmarking Survey, performed for the second time 
in 1996 by SustainAbility and the United Nations Environment Programme.  
 
Environmental reporting in NZIJ very slow to take off.  KPMG Peat Marwick in association 
with the Society of Accountants, launched a Best Annual Environmental Report Award in 
1995 as part of the Society’s annual report awards. 
 
Entries have risen each year and the standard of the reports has increased, but overall the 
standard still falls well short of international initiatives.  The slow take up was a factor in the 
inclusion in the Coalition agreement between National and New Zealand First in 1996 of an 
undertaking to make disclosure of environmental impacts by companies mandatory.  This 
agreement was not implemented.  Some policy work was undertaken within MfE & in 1998 a 
scene-setting report “Corporate Environmental Reporting” was published by KPMG.  
Hughey (2000) addresses some of these issues in relation to Ecologically Sustainable 
Development for fishing in Australia and New Zealand. 
 
 39
CHAPTER 10 
 
ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
Environmental externalities have been recognised and studied for more than a century since 
the days of Marshall and Pigou (Verhoef 1999). A wide range of instruments has been 
proposed to overcome externalities as discussed in Section 3.2.  Variants of those instruments 
can potentially be used to modify fishing company behaviour to internalise environmental 
externalities.  Many of these instruments have been used in New Zealand fisheries 
management, to a greater or lesser extent.  Notable exceptions include performance bonds, 
conservation easements (covenants), legal remedies and information provision to achieve 
informal regulation.  Table 13 summarises these instruments. 
 
Determining which instruments are ‘best’ requires some criteria to judge performance and 
data to evaluate performance of the instruments. However, and as noted by (Slooten and 
Dawson 1995), most evaluation studies of the performance of some of these instruments are 
at best limited.  Consequently, clear and robust criteria are necessary to evaluate this 
performance as a basis for selecting appropriate management tools.   
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CHAPTER 11 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Negative externalities are costs imposed upon another person or firm where there is no 
contractual relationship between the two parties.  The term externality is widely used to 
describe situations where there is damage caused to part of the natural environment.  In those 
cases costs are recognised by individuals who are concerned about the natural environment.  
 
Determining the nature and extent of the environmental externalities associated with many 
New Zealand fisheries is sometimes not easy because the marine environment is difficult to 
research.  Moreover, there is currently no accepted framework or policy for the assessment of 
fisheries’ environmental impacts.  However, it is clear that some commercial fisheries in New 
Zealand are associated with significant environmental externalities.  While non-fish bycatch 
is often publicised, our initial assessment is that bottom trawling and dredging are likely to 
cause the most serious environmental externalities associated with New Zealand commercial 
fishing, both for the short and for the long term.  
 
Commercial fishing firms pursue profits, and their behaviour can potentially be modified by 
several means to reduce the level of externalities associated with fishing toward a desired or 
optimum level. A variety of instruments has been tried in fisheries around the world to avoid, 
remedy or mitigate the environmental externalities associated with fishing.  These 
instruments and others from other areas of environmental management have been identified 
and evaluated for their potential application in fisheries management.  Ultimately, choice of 
mechanism(s) is strongly dependent on the fish species pursued, fishing technology 
employed, industry structure, and nature of the environmental externality.  In practice, 
combinations of instruments are frequently used which complement or support each other.  
 
The effectiveness of these various instruments is not easily assessed and in Part 2 of this 
project we will identify criteria that can be used to guide mechanism selection. A range of 
criteria can be used to evaluate the performance of internalisation instruments and judgement 
is required to determine choice and sequencing of performance criteria. 
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Table 13 
A Summary of the Instruments, Examples of their Main World  
and NZ Uses and Potential Application to Fisheries Management 
 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ 
uses 
Applicability to  fishing 
 
Regulatory 
No take zones 
 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
 No fishing in specified zones 
means externalities not created 
Marine 
Reserves 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
protect habitat 
Banks 
Peninsula, Long 
Bay etc 
Area set aside for preservation 
of marine species 
Closed 
seasons, areas 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
Near sub 
Antarctic 
islands. 
No fishing during designated 
times and /or in prescribed areas.
Size or sex 
selectivity 
Direct effort away 
from specified ages, 
sex individuals 
Rock lobster, 
size requirement 
Requirement for fishers to return 
to sea all prohibited catch 
Bycatch 
Reduction 
Devices 
(BRD) 
Reduce rate of 
bycatch of fish and 
other species 
Pingers on gill 
nets 
Vary technology used while 
fishing to reduce bycatch of fish 
or other species 
Technology 
ban 
Prevent externalities 
associated with 
specific harvesting 
technologies  
Drift netting ban Reduce bycatch by only 
allowing techniques which cause 
few externalities 
Input 
limitations 
Reduce externalities 
associated with 
number of potlifts, 
boat days etc 
 Reduce volume of fishing 
activity and associated 
externalities 
Catch 
limitations 
Reduce externalities 
associated with 
effort 
Foveaux Strait 
oysters 
Limit total harvesting and 
associated externalities 
Retention and 
utilisation 
requirements 
Reduce dumping of 
target and non -
target species 
Catching 
Against 
Anothers Quota 
(CAAQ), 
Fishing Against 
Anothers Quota 
(FAAQ) 
Allow non target catch to be 
landed, not dumped 
 
Financial systems 
Charger Provide incentive to 
reduce, eg, pollution 
Conservation 
Services Levy, 
applied to some 
non-fish bycatch 
Apply tax to variable inputs, 
boats, outputs, to reduce profits 
and externalities 
Subsidies Reduce costs of 
inputs 
R&D assistance Reduce costs of developing 
BRD 
Environmental 
performance 
bonds 
Provide financial 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities 
Mining, 
biodiversity 
protection 
Provide incentive to not damage 
habitat or marine ecosystem 
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Financial 
inducements 
Bribe to behave in 
desired way 
 Financial reward if do not create 
environmental externalities 
Rights based    
IQ, ITQ, IVQ 
CDQ, Share 
fisheries 
Reduce race to fish NZ QMS Creation of rights reduces need 
to race, provides incentive to 
maintain asset, so less 
externalities created 
 
Voluntary approaches 
Co 
management 
Right holders draw 
up operating systems 
Challenger 
Scallop 
Peer agreements reduce 
externalities 
Codes of 
practice 
Agreed behaviour 
which limits 
externalities  
HSNO, Agchem Industry develop, adopt, codes 
which limit or preclude 
externalities 
Accredited 
environmental 
management 
systems 
Industry develops 
systems - externally 
audited prior to 
accreditation 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council, ISO 
14001 
Industry develop, adopt, systems 
with environmental policy which 
aims to limit or preclude 
externalities 
Conservation 
easements 
Negotiated 
agreements 
restricting a parties 
behaviour 
QEII Trust, 
Ducks 
Unlimited 
Negotiated agreement to not take 
certain actions eg create 
externalities 
 
Legal Remedies 
Tort law Liability for 
pollution damages 
RMA is a 'strict 
liability' law 
Potential damages claims 
provide incentive to avoid 
creating externalities 
 
Education and Information Supply 
Publications, 
guides, kits, 
etc 
numerous Numerous, e.g., 
biodiversity 
protection 
Informed people change 
behaviour, not create 
externalities 
Informal 
regulation e.g., 
environmental 
reporting 
Toxics Release 
Inventory and 
corporate 
environmental 
reporting 
 Information release plus 
community pressure, modifies 
firm behaviour 
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